[September '23: Page under construction.]
1. ‘Knowledge-Norms in a Common-Law Crucible’ — Ratio; https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12307.
Abstract: Not only is the common‐law standard of proof of mere likelihood in ordinary civil cases justifiable, but its justifiability supports the conclusion that there is no general norm that one must assert that p only if p is known. An argument by Voltaire is formalized to show that the mere likelihood standard is rational. It is also shown that no applicable norm preempts the common‐law rule. An objection that takes the pertinent knowledge‐norm to be honoured in the breach is rejected by appeal to the absence of blameworthiness in alleged breaches of interest. An objection that takes civil verdicts to be manifestations of acceptance, rather than assertoric, is considered and rejected.
Penultimate draft: here.
Below you'll find descriptions of work-in-progress. Some work, noted as such, is joint with Yuval Abrams. Titles in [brackets] are tentative or a cloaking-device to try and preserve anonymity during peer-review.
2. [A paper on what makes lies lies]
I use the semantics of lying about a subject-matter (developed by Richard Holton) to argue that what makes lie lies is a certain mentality and type of communication, namely: lies occur when, and because, one's consciously aware that one misrepresented some subject-matter. In talking about what makes a lie a lie, I'm adverting to the set of facts that make an action lying -- to what metaphysically grounds lies. One needs to be careful not to run this constitutive issue together with others that are distinct, like the morality of lying versus mere misleading. I show how this treatment is superior to leading rivals, including (inter alia) a deception-based account due to Jennifer Lackey, another due to knowledge of falsehood assembled by Ben Holguín, and a third based on misrepresenting belief by Seana Shiffrin. I do this via theoretical virtues associated with inference to the best explanation as well as raising doubts about whether rival theories of lying get the semantics of lying-ascriptions right.
[2. A paper on protecting reputation via the private law using defamation and false light torts, which uses liability-rules to promote more credible speech and to track culpability.]
[3. 'Propositional Blueprints']
[4. 'Misuse of Naked Stats']
[5. 'Precedent in Administrative Law']
[6. 'Only the Best Explanation Wins: Legal Proof, Explanation, and Probability']
[7. 'Market-Share Liability and Corrective Justice']